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ABSTRACT 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have become common in providing high-quality infrastructure in 
many countries worldwide. One of the main reasons for PPP agreements is to improve efficiency 
and quality in the delivery of public services, as well as to boost investments for expensive projects. 
Despite PPPs having been particularly widespread in the case of the construction and rehabilitation 
of high-capacity road infrastructure, their impact in terms of road safety outcomes is still 
unexplored. This paper studies the effects of PPPs on road safety outcomes by taking advantage of 
the variety of management models provided in the Spanish highway network. Results based on a 
panel-data fixed-effects method show that the most relevant aspect influencing road safety 
outcomes is the quality of design of the road. However, we find strong evidence suggesting that 
privately operated highways perform better in terms of road safety outcomes than publicly operated 
highways, for roads with a similar quality of design.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Road accidents are among the main causes of death around the world. According to the World 
Health Organization (2015), more than 1.2 million people die every year on the roads, and for each 
person that dies there are at least 20 others that sustain nonfatal injuries, as a result of traffic 
crashes. Apart from the human suffering, the economic costs associated with these tragedies are 
high in terms of health spending, insurance costs, productivity losses and congestion costs. The last 
estimates of the European Commission (2010) calculate that 130 billion euros - approximately 2% 
of the GDP - are economic costs associated with road accidents. More recently, the International 
Road Assessment Program (2015) has found that the global economic cost of road deaths and 
serious injuries is about 1.8 trillion dollars per year in the world, an average of 3% of the GDP in 
each country. 
There is a collective public interest in improving global road safety. Nonetheless, road transport 
remains as one of the most dangerous modes of transport. In 2015, in the European Union alone, 
the total number of fatalities from road accidents was 26,134, while from railways and airplanes the 
number of lives lost was just 27 and 150, respectively.1 Improving road safety is linked to lower 
social and economic costs and more sustainable development. Therefore, multitudinous initiatives 
are currently being taken by transport authorities worldwide. 
From 1990 to 2015 governments around the world have awarded more than 950 PPP road projects 
with a total amount of investment of 267,039 million dollars.2 In many developed and developing 
countries, PPPs are an important and attractive alternative for financing and managing road 
highways (Engel et al., 2003; Bel and Foote, 2009; Albalate, 2014). One of the most common 
strategies proposed by policy makers to reach better road safety outcomes has been to upgrade the 
quality of the roads. Nevertheless, public debt burden and fiscal stress have led governments to find 
ways of achieving better roads without compromising the state’s accountability. The provision of 
better roads through public private partnership (PPP) has become almost normal practice to 
circumvent budgetary restrictions (Hammami et al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2017). Thus, governments 
                                                          
1 Eurostat database. Data for 28 EU Member States. 
2 The World Bank database.  
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find an ally in the private sector to meet the challenge of providing new and better road 
infrastructure. 
Another important argument for the implementation of PPPs has been to increase economic 
efficiency (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; World Bank, 2012). Given that the private sector is profit-
making, the lifecycle costs should be optimized. However, within the property rights theory of 
ownership based on incomplete contracting, it has been argued that although private management 
may improve productive performance it may harm the quality of services (Hart et al., 1997; Hart, 
2003), and indirectly, the safety outcomes of the service delivered. Supporters of private 
management claim that the private sector can provide public services more efficiently than 
governments, but critics claim that private companies will prioritize economic revenues over the 
quality and safety of services. Empirical evidence of the productive performance of road 
investment, as between PPPs and traditional procurement, is limited and findings show mixed 
results (Blanc-Brude et al., 2009; Raisbek et al., 2010; Chasey et al., 2012). 
However, other scholars argue that it is precisely the drive to improve the quality of services that 
brings about PPPs (Harris, 2004; Hodge and Greve, 2007). According to the European 
Commission (2003), the quality of services achieved under PPPs is better than traditional 
procurement due to the fact that the private sector introduces innovation in service delivery, 
promotes better integration of services, improves economies of scale and allows performance-based 
contracts. Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the relationship between quality and 
ownership or management models, particularly where road safety is concerned. 
Indeed, an improved design and maintenance of roads would reduce accidents and provide users 
with more efficient mobility, comfort and lower vehicle operating costs (Burningham and 
Stankevich, 2005). Moreover, some practitioners suggest that there are fewer accidents on private 
roads than public roads (Samuel and Poole, 2000; Sisiopiku et al., 2006; Block, 2009), advocating 
for the road safety benefits of PPPs. Contrarily, others advise that private management can be more 
costly and might lead to problems with safety and quality (Kusnet, 2007). However, the effects of 
management on quality measured in road safety outcomes have not yet been deeply analyzed.  
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In this paper we aim to shed light on this gap by analyzing empirically the effects of management 
models (PPPs vs. public management) on road safety outcomes in Spain, where there is a mix of 
management models composed of publicly managed highways and those privately managed under 
PPP agreements. We apply different count data models, within the framework of panel-data 
econometric techniques, in order to evaluate the role of management models on the determination 
of the number of accidents with victims and the number of victims (casualties).   
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on PPPs 
and road safety. Section 3 defines the Spanish mixed model of highway management that allows us 
to compare both management models within the same network and countrywide experience. 
Section 4 provides the data and variables used and the empirical strategy employed. Results are 
presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude.  
 
2. LITERATURE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ROAD SAFETY  
2.1. Public-Private Partnership: A definition 
A public private partnership (PPP) can be broadly defined as a contractual agreement between 
public administration and at least one private company, in which the private party is engaged to 
finance, build or rehabilitate and manage a project through a long-term contractual agreement until 
the contract expires and the asset returns to public ownership (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
However, there are several aspects to this concept that include some common features. Firstly, a 
PPP is a cooperative activity between the public and private sectors (Osborne, 2002; Van Ham and 
Koppenjan, 2001). Secondly, risks are shared between parties (HM Treasury, 2003; OECD, 2008). 
Thirdly, various tasks are bundled under the same contract (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Hodge et al., 
2010). Fourthly, these contracts can take many forms3 such as; build, operate and transfer (BOT), 
                                                          
3 Industrial organization requires that to be considered a PPP the bundling of construction and operation 
must be under the same contract (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Bennett and Iossa, 2006). 
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build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT), design, build, finance and operate (DBOT), and 
rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT) (GAO, 1999; World Bank, 2012). Fifthly, two types of 
infrastructure investment are available in PPP projects: greenfields and brownfields. Investing in a 
new infrastructure asset is considered as a greenfield project and investing in an existing asset at the 
operational phase is a brownfield project. Greenfield assets have high levels of business, 
construction and demand risks, while brownfield investments are perceived to be the lowest-return 
and lowest-risk sector of infrastructure investment (Bitsch et al., 2010). Therefore, operational risk 
on brownfield projects should be smaller than in greenfield investment due to the asset having been 
working for some time. 
2.2. Public-Private Partnerships and road safety outcomes 
Although the empirical literature has not explored the direct impact of PPPs on road safety, we can 
identify two strands of related literature. On the one hand, research on the role of tolls in producing 
traffic shift onto alternative roads (re-routing effects). On the other hand, research exploring the 
influence of the introduction of performance-based incentives in road management contracts.  
Re-routing effects and road safety 
Re-routing literature provides evidence that road accidents are higher on roads that are alternatives 
to tolled highways, due to the fact that charging for the use of the better road may encourage too 
many drivers to choose alternative free minor roads, which are generally of poorer quality or not 
prepared to receive high amounts of traffic. This literature is connected to our work in the sense 
that PPPs are generally associated with user payments via tolls, even though other PPP models may 
involve shadow tolls, which are not charged to users but to taxpayers. Publicly operated highways 
might also charge tolls to users, as is common in the United States and was common in some 
European countries such as France, Italy and Portugal before the privatization of their networks.  
One of the earliest works is Lyles et al. (1990). This study evaluates the crash frequency and crash 
rate of large trucks in Michigan. The most significant findings were that crash rates were five to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
6 
 
seven times higher on lowest class roadways than those on the controlled access system. Similarly, a 
recent study, also for the US, by Swan and Belzer (2013), estimates the crash cost per vehicle mile 
traveled for trucks that diverted from the Ohio Turnpike to avoid paying tolls. Results show that 
crash costs are highest for the roads to which truck traffic was diverted. 
In Europe we also find similar studies. Broughton and Gower (1998) analyzed the effects of 
motorway tolls on the number of accidents in the United Kingdom. Results show that a 10% 
diversion of motorway traffic from the toll motorways in Kent would increase the number of 
accidents in the entire county by about 3.5%. In this same line of research, Albalate (2011) tests 
whether charging for the use of highways might negatively affect road safety outcomes on the 
adjacent free roads. The author found that road accidents in Spain are higher on routes adjacent to 
toll motorways than those adjacent to free motorways, controlling for traffic and other potential 
determinants of road safety. And more recently, Baumgarten and Middelkamp (2015) analyzed the 
impact of the implementation of the German heavy good vehicle toll and the re-routing effects on 
road safety outcomes. Results of this study indicate that interurban toll charging causes traffic 
diversion, producing a negative impact on Germany’s road safety outcomes.  
Finally, at a national scale, we find the work by Albalate and Bel (2012), which investigates the 
relationship between different types of road quality and their impact on national safety outcomes in 
Europe. Their findings suggest that, distinguishing between free and tolled motorways, the former 
were associated with a statistically significant reduction in traffic fatalities, probably as a 
consequence of the re-routing effect.  
Public-private partnership and safety incentives in contracts 
Some theoretical approaches to PPPs hold that the introduction of performance-based incentives in 
road management contracts may contribute to improving road safety outcomes (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2007). However, empirical analyses of these effects are scarce and limited to few works. 
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This literature is based on the assumption that many aspects of improving road safety, for example 
pavement maintenance and renewal, safety emergency assistance, safety equipment, etc., can be 
introduced into the contract through an incentive mechanism.  
As far as we know, empirical studies on this incentive scheme in road contracts can only be found 
for the case of Spain. By using a dataset with public and private highways in a cross-section setting 
for the year 2006, Rangel et al. (2012) found that there are more fatalities, injuries and accidents on 
highways without road safety incentives than on highways with incentives. Also, Rangel et al. (2013) 
evaluated incentive schemes by using data only from private highways between 2007 and 2009, 
finding that road incentives are significant factors reducing the number of accidents and injuries but 
not decreasing the number of fatalities. More recently, Rangel and Vassallo (2015) expanded the 
previous dataset, including all types of highways - not only private but also public - confirming that 
there are more accidents on highways without incentives than those with incentives.4  
Some of these papers included a variable controlling for the road management model. However, it 
was not the main focus of their analyses (see Rangel et al., 2012 and Rangel and Vassallo, 2015). 
These papers conclude that toll highways (privately managed) are safer than the second generation 
of public highways. However, in the case of Rangel et al. (2012) results indicated that the first 
generation of public highways, is safer than the second generation of public highways. This result 
was considered by the authors as an odd feature of their findings and, subsequently, it was reversed 
in Rangel and Vassallo (2015). 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. Firstly, it differs from the previous 
research on re-routing by exploring the direct safety effect on the road managed by the private 
manager, and not on the adjacent alternative roads stressed by the diversion of traffic. Secondly, we 
provide a panel-data econometric estimation to explore the role of the management model on road 
safety outcomes, distinguishing by the quality of design of roads in a long panel-data fixed-effects 
model. Therefore, we separate the quality of road design into different tiers which allows us to 
make a more robust comparison between the private and public management models, avoiding the 
                                                          
4 This paper dismisses the use of a panel-data specification arguing that spatial and temporal correlation 
problems were not expected in the sample analyzed. 
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bias produced by the different engineering qualities of the infrastructure. Thus, our results should 
not be influenced by the construction design. 
 
3. THE SPANISH MIXED ROAD NETWORK 
The highway network management in Spain is quite singular compared to most European 
countries. Spain has a long tradition of building and managing road highways through PPPs. 
However, since the end of the 80s different types of management can be found (Bel and Fageda, 
2005; Albalate et al., 2009; Albalate, 2014). The first private highways were awarded in Spain at the 
end of the 60s. Having overcome the hardest years of the autarky, the Spanish economy was 
growing fast but transportation infrastructures were insufficient for productive activities. An 
expanded and modern highway network was required at a time when the public budget was 
insufficient to afford such investment. The government opted for private funding and by the 
second half of the 70s more than 1,800 km of private highways were already constructed. 
 
In the early 80s, the democratic transition and the oil crisis increased the financial expenses and 
construction costs, bringing the private highway expansion work to a halt. However, a large number 
of kilometers of the Spanish network was single and dual carriageways and the growth of the 
highway network was still necessary5. The new government that took office in 1982 and remained 
until 1996 − politically opposed to continued expansion of the highway network with private 
participation − approved the first program of public highways6 and started to build the first 
generation of publicly managed free highways. However, this first generation of free highways was 
constructed by doubling existing carriageways7. The three main reasons for doubling were 
economics (to take advantage of the existing road), traffic flow (private highways had not solved 
the traffic congestion on the adjacent roads), and safety (highways are safer) (Sánchez et al., 2007). 
                                                          
5 See MOPU (1984). 
6 Within the Plan General de Carreteras 1984-1991. 
7 The first generation of publicly managed highways is the Spanish radials: A-1 Madrid-Burgos, A-2 Madrid-
Zaragoza, A-3 Madrid-Alicante, A-4 Madrid-Badajoz and A-6 Madrid-Benavente.  
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At the end of the 80s more than 2,000 km of first generation free highways were already 
constructed but the geometric design of the roads (road design) was inferior to that of private 
highways. 
 
In 1993 the government terminated the first program of public highways although the expansion of 
the network continued to develop but without doubling the existing carriageways. In 1996 the 
government changed and interest in private financing of highways was renewed. From 1996 to 
2006 more than 800 km of private highways were already awarded. Nevertheless, the government 
continued constructing public highways8. At the end of 2006 the Spanish highway network totaled 
around 9,700 km. Private operators managed 2,700 km and the public sector 7,000 km (2,000 km of 
which correspond to first generation public highways, and the remaining 5,000 km to the second 
generation). 
 
Since 2006 to the present day, no more private construction has been commissioned. However, at 
the end of 2007, against the backdrop of an increase in the traffic flow, velocity and number of 
accidents on the first generation of public highways, there was a need to find a formula that made it 
possible for the government to finance the necessary actions9, and so 1,000 km of the first 
generation of public highways were transferred to private companies for a period of 19 years10.  
 
Nowadays, 24% of the total highway network is managed by private companies and 76% by the 
public sector. However, the first generation of public highways − 50% managed by private operator 
and 50% by the public sector − has inferior geometric design than the private motorways and the 
second generation of public highways. Table 1 shows the length of the Spanish highway (RCE) by 
road operator and quality of the geometric design of roads.  
 
                                                          
8 In 1999 the state modified the technical normative. See Order 2107/1999 of the 27th December (BOE, 
27/12/1999). 
9 See PEIT (2005). 
10 In September 2012, an additional 49 km of public highways were transferred to private operators. 
However, in this study, we have not counted these 49 km as privately managed because the data we analyzed 
are from 2008 to 2012. 
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Table 1. Spanish highway composition by road operator and quality of road design 
Operator Kilometers % of km 
     Public High 7566 67% 
     Public Low 1054 9% 
Total Public 8620 76% 
      Private High 1717 15% 
     Private Low 1042 9% 
Total Private 2759 24% 
Total 11379 100% 
Note: Own elaboration  
 
As we can see in Table 1, 82% of Spanish highways have high construction quality: 67% managed 
by the public sector (public_h) and 15% by a private operator (private_h). High-quality public 
highways have separated carriageways for each direction of circulation, have limited access to 
neighboring properties, do not cross any other path and offer free access to road users. In contrast, 
high-quality private highways have different carriageways for each direction of circulation separated 
from each other, have no access to neighboring properties, do not cross any other path, are 
exclusively for car traffic and only offer access to users by a direct toll. 
Of the 18% of highways that are classified as of low quality of construction, half are publicly 
managed (public_l) and the other half by private operators (private_l). These low-quality highways 
have the same road design characteristics because both belong to the first generation of public 
highways which were constructed by doubling existing conventional carriageways. That being said, 
low-quality private highways have undergone some conditional improvements since their 
privatization at the end of 2007. Nonetheless, they may never reach the benchmark high quality of 
design due to the initial geometrical design that cannot be substantially modified. 
We choose to analyze the case of Spain because of the particular mixed model of management that 
allows for a comparison between private and public management models within the same national 
network. Thus, we are able to compare different forms of delivery with similar road designs. This 
allows us to better pinpoint the true effects of management on road safety performance.  
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4. METHODS AND DATA  
4.1. Methodology  
The most common methodology for modeling road accidents is based on count models because 
the nature of accident occurrence is random, discrete, non-negative and does not follow a normal 
(Gaussian) distribution. Different approaches have been applied to evaluating road safety 
determinants. Many different prediction models are available for estimating the number of 
accidents linked to a set of exogenous variables (see Lord and Mannering, 2010; Mannering and 
Bhat, 2014). Given the characteristics of the outcome variables described above, count-data 
regression models based on a Poisson or on a negative binomial distribution are the most 
commonly used.11 Nevertheless, a strong restriction of the Poisson model is that the mean and the 
variance have to be equal. This is the so-called equidispersion assumption. Unfortunately, this 
assumption is often violated when variance exceeds the mean, which indicates overdispersion in the 
data. It is when count data display overdispersion that the negative binomial regression model is 
more appropriate (Miaou and Lum, 1993; Hadi et al., 1995; Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000; Lord, 
2006). The negative binomial distribution allows for a more flexible modeling of the variance than 
the Poisson model and ensures the avoidance of biased standard errors and inefficient estimated 
coefficients.  
Since the seminal paper of Hausman et al. (1984), panel count models have been applied in road 
safety analysis in order to correct for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity. Poisson and 
negative binomial panel data have been used in both random effects and fixed effects alternatives 
(Noland, 2003; Chin and Quddud, 2003; Yaacob et al., 2011; Hosseinpour et al., 2014). The 
random-effects model assumes that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. If this is the case, then the random-effects model is unbiased, consistent and more 
efficient than the fixed-effects model. If the unobserved individual heterogeneity is correlated with 
the exogenous variables, then the random-effects model will produce inconsistent estimates. In this 
                                                          
11 If the distribution of counts contains a much larger than expected number of zeros, Zero Inflate models 
are more appropriate (Lord et al., 2005b).  
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case the fixed-effects model, which always provides consistent estimates – but is less efficient than 
the random-effects model - is the most reliable choice.    
4.2. Model choice 
Our data on road accidents are collected in panel form (846 control stations followed for 5 years, 
from 2008 to 2012) and a simple pooled Poisson model is first employed as a benchmark model. In 
the Poisson model, the assumption of independent observations over individual control stations 
and across time is consistent with the strong assumption that the mean and the variance have to be 
equal. The Wald test and the Likelihood Ratio tests allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no 
overdispersion, thus we conduct a pooled negative binomial regression as a preferred model12. We 
assume that individual effects are independent across control stations for a given year but note that 
individual effects can be correlated over time for a given control station. For this reason, panel-data 
models should be more appropriate than pooled models. The Likelihood Ratio test is used to check 
whether the data are better modeled using a panel structure or a pooled estimator with constant 
overdispersion. Results corroborate the reasoning that a panel structure is more appropriate13.  
As described above, in order to consider differences across control stations, two approaches can be 
used: random effects and fixed effects. In this study, both panel random-effects and fixed-effects 
negative binomial regression models have been applied and compared. Because we have some 
unobserved time invariant characteristics of the infrastructure variables such as lane widths, road 
curvature, and intersections that may violate the strict exogeneity assumption required for random 
effects, the recommended model used must be fixed effects. Notwithstanding the above, we 
conduct the Hausman test and results allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic 
differences between the two models. This is the same as confirming the correlation between 
unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors, which indicates that the conditional fixed-effects 
negative binomial model is the only one ensuring consistent results.  
                                                          
12 The 𝜒𝜒2statistic of the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value=0.000. The 𝜒𝜒2statistic of the LR 
test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value=0.000.  
13 The 𝜒𝜒2statistic of the LR test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value=0.000.  
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In spite of the suitability of the fixed-effects negative binomial model there have been two different 
formulations. Firstly, the conditional estimation of fixed-effects negative binomial model developed 
by Hausman et al. (1984). Secondly, the unconditional estimation of fixed-effects negative binomial 
model proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2007). The main difference is that in 
the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model, the fixed effects enter the model through the 
dispersion parameter rather than the conditional mean function adopted by unconditional 
estimation. The conditional fixed-effects modeling implies that the time invariant variable can 
coexist with the effects, therefore time invariant variables are not dropped out from the model. 
Because the main variable of interest in this study is management, which is time invariant, the 
appropriate estimator is the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model. In addition, using 
the conditional fixed-effects estimator, the incidental parameters problem (panel level 
heterogeneity) is avoided because the likelihood function is conditioned for each observed panel 
outcome by the sum of the counts for that panel. Once we eliminate the panel level heterogeneity, 
applying usual asymptotic theory with fixed time, and observations tending to infinity, the 
conditional fixed-effects estimator is consistent.  
In order to obtain empirically the effects of management on road safety in the Spanish highway 
network, the following reduced form equation is estimated, employing the conditional two-way 
fixed-effects negative binomial model: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + β𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a count of accidents (acc_with) or victims (vic) in control 
station i and year t, 𝛼𝛼 is the constant term in the model. The main variable in the estimation is 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 which identifies whether the highway is managed by the public administration or by a 
private manager. In a disaggregated model we substitute this variable with four other variables: 
high-quality public highway (public_h), low-quality public highway (public_l), high-quality private 
highway (private_h) or low-quality private highway (private_l). Xit is the vector of road safety 
standard determinants, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is the control station-specific fixed effect from which we obtain the 
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locally specific road safety data and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is the year-specific fixed effect. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
The subscripts i and t define the cross-section and the time dimension of our data, respectively.  
In the equation the number of counts 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with E(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = Ѳ𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and var(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = (1 + Ѳ𝑖𝑖)Ѳ𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 ) and Ѳ𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖/𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖. As 
previously defined, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the individual specific fixed effects and 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 is the negative binomial 
overdispersion parameter which can vary across individual effects and can take any value. 
Nevertheless, to estimate the parameters for the fixed-effects negative binomial model, the 
overdispersion parameter 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 has been dropped out for conditional maximum likelihood.14 
Furthermore, we use the exposure variable 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 because it is known that traffic flow varies 
from one control station to another and the total annual vehicles per km traveled could affect the 
count.15 This means that the outcome variable needs a rate which is just a count per unit of 
vehicles/km traveled. The negative binomial manages exposure variables by using natural 
logarithms to change the outcome variable from a rate into a count. The exposure variable is 
entered in the log link function as the natural logarithm and it is required to have a fixed coefficient 
equal to one. The coefficient of one allows turning the count into a rate.   
4.3. Data and variables 
Data 
This study draws on a dataset extracted from the Spanish traffic map database (Mapa de tráfico, 
2012) published annually by the Spanish General Traffic Directorate. The database is generated 
from two different sources. Traffic data are supplied by the Ministry of Public Works. Road 
accidents data are provided by the Ministry of Homeland Affairs, responsible for road safety in 
Spain. Accidents data cover all reported accidents with at least one person injured, recording the 
number of injuries and number of deaths, at the moment that the accident occurs, in segments 
belonging to different road categories of the state road network (RCE). The Spanish RCE on traffic 
                                                          
14 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
15 For example, a count of 15 annual number of accidents with victims out of 50 million of vehicles per km 
traveled is much smaller than a count of 15 out of 10. 
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map 2012 is segmented in 4,788 homogeneous lengths of 5.44 km. In each segment there is a 
control station that records annual and historical information on accidents, injuries and fatalities, 
and traffic mix. Since we are merely interested on high capacity roads, we avoid using data related 
to two undivided dual carriageway and single carriage roads. In order to avoid selection bias we 
considered interurban and urban segmented road stretches with and without accidents recorded. 
Therefore, a total of 4,234 highway control stations were extracted out of 5,528 from the 2008 to 
2012 database. Control stations without complete information for safety outcomes and traffic flow 
were excluded. The traffic map database also includes information on infrastructure characteristics 
such as number of lanes. 
Dependent variables 
The count dependent variables considered in this study are the annual number of accidents with 
victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic) recorded in each control station. The 
variable annual number of victims is the sum of the annual number of injuries and the annual 
number of fatalities. We aggregate injuries and fatalities in one variable because data on injuries and 
fatalities are recorded at the moment the accident occurs. If a victim does not immediately die, we 
cannot identify if she finally dies because of the accident. Information on these variables has been 
obtained from the 2012 traffic map database. 
The main variable of interest in this study is management (manage), however as we are interested in 
estimating the true effects of management, a quality categorization of the geometric design of roads 
has been conducted. Of the total highway network 24% is managed by private companies and the 
remaining 76% by the public sector. However, the geometric design of roads differs. The variable 
management is introduced in the model as a binary variable that identifies whether the road is 
managed by a private manager (value 1), or under public management (value 0). This variable, once 
it is disaggregated to deal with the different quality of design, is substituted by four binary variables. 
The high-quality public highway (public_h), low-quality public highway (public_l), high-quality 
private highway (private_h) or low-quality private highway (private_l). All of these are dummy 
variables. Thus, we need to drop out one of them to avoid perfect collinearity, and coefficients 
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must be interpreted with respect to the variable excluded from the model. All information on these 
variables is obtained from the 2012 traffic map database and from the 2012 Spanish toll highways 
annual report. Also, we take advantage of the research conducted by Sánchez et al. (2007) to 
identify the low-quality public highways. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variables by operator and quality of the road design. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables by operator and quality of road 
design 
    acv1 vic1 
Operator Obs Mean S.D Min Max Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Public 3141 22.14 48.97 0 1498 3138 34.97 63.55 0 691 
Public_H  2592 19.54 37.05 0 344 2590 31.23 58.24 0 512 
Public_L  549 34.47 82.06 0 1498 548 52.62 82.01 0 691 
Private 1093 14.54 28.44 0 286 1093 24.5 46.4 0 444 
Privat_H  729 7.87 13.04 0 133 729 13.24 21.41 0 175 
Privat_L   364 27.91 42.71 0 286 364 47.04 69.25 0 444 
Total 4234 20.18 44.22 0 1498 4231 32.26 59.76 0 691 
 
Exogenous variables 
Our empirical model of road safety determinants must build on the grounds of previous research. It 
is well known that personal income, traffic conditions, infrastructure features, weather conditions 
and road users’ behavior might affect road accidents.  
There has been significant interest on the relation between road accidents and traffic conditions 
such as traffic flows (Martin, 2002; Lord et al., 2005a; Anastasopoulos and Mannering, 2009), traffic 
mix (Albalate, 2011; Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016) and speed of driving (Nilsson, 2004; Pei et al., 
2012; Quddus, 2013). On the one hand, most studies reveal a positive relationship between 
accidents and traffic flow and traffic mix (Wang et al., 2013). However, other studies found that 
heavy vehicles do not seem to be associated with poorer road safety outcomes (Albalate, 2011; 
Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016). Thus, our model will control the number of vehicles per km 
(vehi_km) and the percentage of heavy vehicles (heavy_vehi). The variable vehi_km is defined as 
vehi_km = total average annual daily traffic * length of segment * 365. The variable heavy_vehi is the 
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percentage of heavy vehicles in the total average annual daily traffic. Both variables are obtained 
through data compiled in the 2012 traffic map database. Also, we include the average age of the 
vehicle fleet of the province (age_vehi). The variable age_vehi was elaborated from data provided by 
the Spanish General Traffic Directorate. 
On the other hand, the impact of variation in speed on road safety has been widely investigated but 
results suggest that speed has heterogeneous effects on road safety (Wang et al., 2013; Imprialou et 
al., 2006) and no conclusive results are derived. Because we could not confirm this as a variable our 
model does not contribute to the debate on the role of speed.  
Road design is another factor that needs to be taken into account when analyzing road safety. 
Several researchers have focused on analyzing the relationship between accidents and a variety of 
different features of the infrastructure such as lane widths, number of traffic lanes, median 
shoulder, pavement, road curvature, intersections and signalization (Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000; 
Noland and Oh, 2004; Meuleners et al., 2008). In general terms, results conclude that the road’s 
characteristics have a statistically significant impact on safety (Albalate et al., 2013; Wang et al., 
2013). Thus, improvements in road infrastructure have a positive effect in protecting users (Pérez, 
2006; Gomes and Cardoso, 2012). In order to control for infrastructure features we include the 
number of lanes and the type of road - depending on whether it is an urban road or interurban 
road. This is introduced by including the variable interurban, which is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 for control stations placed in interurban sections and 0 otherwise. This is the only physical 
feature that we can include because information on these aspects is very limited in the traffic map 
database.  
Climate and weather conditions have also been important variables in analyses of road safety 
investigation. Most studies show that conditions such as rainfall affect accident outcomes 
(Eisenberg, 2004; Hermans et al., 2006; Caliendo et al., 2007). For this reason we include in our 
equation of determinants the annual number of rainy days. The variable rainy is the annual average 
number of rainy days by province. Data were provided by the Spanish State Meteorological Agency. 
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It is widely known that individual driving behavior is a crucial determinant of road accidents. 
Among others, alcohol consumption, speeding or non-use of seat belt cause more accidents and 
might increase their seriousness. Many analyses of the effectiveness of enforcement laws such us 
speed limits, legal limits of blood alcohol content and seat belt laws have been carried out in recent 
years (Loeb, 2001; Dee et al., 2005; Albalate, 2008). Results suggest that the impact of laws and 
regulations may depend on the driving population under examination (Albalate et al., 2013). We 
therefore include variables of demographic characteristics of the population as in the number of 
young people between 20-29 years old (pop_20a29) and the elderly population above 80 years old 
(pop_˃80). In addition, we include the number of liters of alcohol consumed per capita at home 
(alcohol_pc) to account for the risk of drunk driving.  
We also include the GDP per capita in order to account for the importance of income as a 
determinant of road accidents. 
Data for all of the socio-economic variables are desegregated by province except for the variable 
alcohol_pc, which is only available by autonomous community. The variable GDP_pc and the 
variables pop_20a29 and pop_˃80 were collected from the Spanish National Statistics Institute 
database. The variable alcohol_pc was obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Industry.  
Table 3 provides information for the descriptive statistics of all these control variables.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of control variables 
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
interurban Dummy 0.861994 0.344941 0 1 
lanes Number of lanes by control station 4.304503 0.866894 3 8 
heavy_vehi 
 
Percentage of heavy vehicles from the total AADT 
by control station 
14.93672 8.619115 0.934113 61.22128 
vehi_km 
 
Total AADT* length of segment * 365 by control 
station 
51800000 51300000 176718.4 3.14E+08 
GDP_pc Annual GDP per capita at current prices by province 21279.37 4257.559 14763 37675 
alcohol_pc 
 
Annual litres alcohol consumption per capita 
inside of home by regions 
23.5958 3.577236 15.62 34.91 
age_vehi Total average age vehicle fleets by province 11.52345 1.002196 9.09857 14.23427 
pop_20a29 
 
Total population driving age between 20 and 29 
year old by province 
177262.2 223154.8 10134 934239 
pop_˃80 
 
Total population driving age older than 80 year  
old by province 
 
64405.79 70338.2 8577 295942 
rainy Annual average number of rainy days by province 94.7201 40.59686 8 203.5 
 
 
As a result, our main equation is the following:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + β𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦_𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿5𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚_𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝_20𝑚𝑚29𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝˃80𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿9𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where, 
𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is a dummy variable with value one for highways belonging to interurban 
environment and vale 1 for those placed in urban areas.  
𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is the number of lanes for each segment.  
ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦_𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the percentage of heavy vehicles from the total AADT by control station. 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is the annual GDP per capita at current prices by province.  
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𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is the annual liters alcohol consumption per capita inside of home by regions.  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚_𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : is the average vehicle fleet age by provinces.  
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝_20𝑚𝑚29𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is the total population driving age between 20 and 29 year old by province.  
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝_˃80𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is the total population driving age older than 80 years old by provinces.  
𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : is the annual average number of rainy days by province.  
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 : is the control station fixed effects and  
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖: is the year-specific fixed effect 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term.  
 
5. RESULTS 
In this section we present the effects of management models on two road safety outcomes: the 
annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic). We 
first estimate pooled count data in both Poisson and negative binomial models, after that we 
conduct panel negative binomial estimations with random effects and conditional fixed effects. 
Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for the four models regressed for both dependent 
variables (acc_with and vic). A positive sign indicates an increase in the annual number of accidents 
with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic), whereas a negative sign indicates a 
decrease. Recall that our preferred model is the conditional fixed-effects model.  
As we can see in Table 4, the expected number of accidents and victims for the variable 
management (manage), is statistically significant and negative for all the models regressed. Private 
management is associated with a lower number of accidents and victims. However, this result could 
be biased if private management is more present in roads with high-quality design. Therefore, we 
disaggregate the management variable into three variables indicating the interaction between the 
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management model and the quality of the road. Results of this analysis are reported in Table 5 for 
the four models regressed and for both dependent variables (acc_with and vic). The results 
associated with the variables related to management and quality must be interpreted with respect to 
the category excluded, to avoid perfect collinearity. In our case, the benchmark variable excluded is 
public_h. 
Results show that the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number 
of victims (vic) decrease when the quality of the road design is high. It means that highways with 
high-quality road design are safer than those with low quality design, as expected. Thus, it is clear 
that beyond the management model, the quality of design is a major determinant of road safety. As 
a consequence, any comparison must take into account the homogeneity of quality of design to 
evaluate differences caused by the management model.  
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Table 4. Regression models for accidents with victims and victims by road operator. 
Independent  Dependent Variable (acc_with) and Selected Model Dependent Variable (vic)  
Variables Poisson NegBin RENB FENB Poisson NegBin RENB FENB 
Constant -11.82*** -10.65*** -14.06*** -17.32*** -11.87*** -10.12*** -12.76*** -14.82*** 
  -0.113 -0.519 -0.654 -0.828 -0.087 -0.572 -0.619 -0.76 
manage -0.410*** -0.221*** -0.438*** -0.710*** -0.342*** -0.143*** -0.437*** -0.607*** 
  -0.00988 -0.0475 -0.0729 -0.0977 -0.00768 -0.0522 -0.0679 -0.0867 
interurban -0.0103 -0.225*** 0.0387 -0.139 0.0202*** -0.131* 0.125 -0.222* 
  -0.00897 -0.0615 -0.0957 -0.126 -0.00726 -0.0684 -0.0905 -0.114 
lanes 0.0615*** 0.0497** 0.141*** 0.213*** 0.0576*** 0.0424 0.118*** 0.149*** 
  -0.00299 -0.0242 -0.0329 -0.0472 -0.0024 -0.0269 -0.0302 -0.0403 
heavy_vehi -0.00506*** 0.0037 0.0250*** 0.0222*** -0.00425*** 0.00325 0.0271*** 0.0232*** 
  -0.000567 -0.00247 -0.00266 -0.00306 -0.000446 -0.00272 -0.0027 -0.00309 
GDP_pc 4.78e-06*** 0.00000108 0.0000086 2.36e-05** 3.57e-06*** -0.00000283 -4.64E-07 0.00000697 
  -0.00000153 -0.00000667 -0.00000904 -0.0000115 -0.00000118 -0.00000737 -0.00000838 
-0.0000103 
alcohol_pc -0.0465*** -0.0514*** -0.0859*** -0.0697*** -0.0376*** -0.0471*** -0.116*** -0.0948*** 
  -0.00153 -0.00693 -0.00734 -0.00767 -0.00118 -0.00767 -0.0076 -0.00826 
age_vehi -0.200*** -0.268*** -0.164*** 0.0404 -0.170*** -0.271*** -0.228*** -0.0885* 
  -0.00751 -0.032 -0.0412 -0.0536 -0.00581 -0.035 -0.0385 -0.048 
pop_20a29 -7.43e-07*** -1.32e-06*** 
-7.40e-
07*** 
-1.10e-
06*** 
-3.87e-
07*** 
-1.37e-
06*** 
-7.59e-07** -1.12e-06*** 
  -6.73E-08 -0.00000045 -2.79E-07 -0.00000032 -5.33E-08 -4.97E-07 -3.15E-07 -3.46E-07 
pop_˃80 3.79e-06*** 5.34e-06*** 0.0000013 2.34E-07 2.37e-06*** 5.19e-06*** 1.74e-06* 0.00000123 
  -1.95E-07 -0.00000136 -8.24E-07 -9.18E-07 -1.55E-07 -0.0000015 -9.09E-07 -9.84E-07 
rainy -0.000253 -0.000842 0.00318*** 0.00528*** 0.000387*** -0.00115 0.0013 0.00305*** 
  -0.000158 -0.00073 -0.000872 -0.00102 -0.000123 -0.000804 -0.000857 -0.000994 
ln(vehi_km)  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
           
ln_r NA NA 0.262*** NA NA NA 0.0736 NA 
    -0.0618     -0.069  
ln_s 
NA NA 1.441*** NA NA NA 2.078*** NA 
    -0.0907     -0.117  
lnalpha NA 0.210*** NA NA NA 0.453*** NA NA 
   -0.0267     -0.0249   
Observations 3918 3918 3918 3616 3916 3916 3916 3614 
Number of 
groups 
NA NA 826 738 NA NA 826 738 
Log 
Likelihood 
-37221.072 -13769.297 -13430.502 -9027.9368 -55640.509 -15553.963 -15342.747 -10443.27 
Note: Time dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Regression models for accidents with victims and victims on management by road 
operator and quality of the road design. 
Independent  Dependent Variable (ACV1)  Dependent Variable (VIC1)  
Variables Poisson NegBin RENB FENB Poisson NegBin RENB FENB 
Constant -12.79*** -10.84*** -15.92*** -19.11*** -12.79*** -10.15*** -14.82*** -16.68*** 
  -0.115 -0.517 -0.659 -0.825 -0.0885 -0.568 -0.633 -0.755 
private_h -0.691*** -0.409*** -0.810*** -1.210*** -0.658*** -0.364*** -0.726*** -0.983*** 
  -0.0155 -0.0587 -0.0895 -0.115 -0.012 -0.064 -0.0838 -0.104 
private_l 0.0695*** 0.146** 0.601*** 0.860*** 0.124*** 0.243*** 0.601*** 0.744*** 
  -0.0132 -0.071 -0.102 -0.149 -0.0102 -0.0788 -0.0956 -0.117 
public_l 0.354*** 0.252*** 0.759*** 0.837*** 0.299*** 0.209*** 1.119*** 1.288*** 
  -0.0106 -0.0594 -0.0779 -0.103 -0.00839 -0.0663 -0.0777 -0.0984 
interurban -0.165*** -0.260*** -0.0789 -0.254** -0.104*** -0.149** -0.0215 -0.358*** 
  -0.0101 -0.063 -0.0985 -0.13 -0.0081 -0.0703 -0.0942 -0.117 
lanes 0.0264*** 0.0134 0.0696** 0.0868* 0.0185*** 0.00401 0.0492 0.0427 
  -0.00316 -0.0243 -0.0334 -0.0474 -0.00254 -0.0269 -0.0315 -0.0408 
heavy_vehi -0.00950*** -0.00243 0.0176*** 0.0151*** -0.00914*** -0.00319 0.0157*** 0.0116*** 
  -0.000579 -0.00255 -0.00273 -0.0031 -0.000457 -0.00279 -0.00284 -0.00318 
GDP_pc 1.09e-05*** 0.0000108 3.42e-05*** 4.98e-05*** 1.07e-05*** 0.00000677 2.67e-05*** 3.58e-05*** 
  -1.57E-06 -6.67E-06 -9.12E-06 -0.0000115 -1.21E-06 -7.32E-06 -8.54E-06 -0.0000103 
alcohol_pc -0.0301*** -0.0483*** -0.0728*** -0.0604*** -0.0218*** -0.0449*** -0.0937*** -0.0767*** 
  -0.00158 -0.00682 -0.00704 -0.00733 -0.00122 -0.00753 -0.00744 -0.00784 
age_vehi -0.148*** -0.257*** -0.0573 0.160*** -0.121*** -0.270*** -0.120*** 0.0143 
  -0.00751 -0.0321 -0.0417 -0.0539 -0.0058 -0.0351 -0.0391 -0.0477 
pop_20a29 -1.14e-06*** 
-1.61e-
06*** 
-6.66e-
07*** 
-8.50e-
07*** 
-7.76e-
07*** 
-1.65e-
06*** 
-8.94e-
07*** 
-1.09e-
06*** 
  -6.79E-08 -4.51E-07 -2.57E-07 -2.86E-07 -5.38E-08 -0.0000005 -2.81E-07 -3.01E-07 
pop_˃80 4.58e-06*** 5.78e-06*** 9.36E-07 9.37E-08 3.17e-06*** 5.59e-06*** 1.47e-06* 0.00000094 
  -1.98E-07 -1.35E-06 -7.59E-07 -8.19E-07 -1.57E-07 -0.0000015 -8.13E-07 -8.58E-07 
rainy 0.000948*** -0.000378 0.00483*** 0.00653*** 0.00150*** -0.000766 0.00342*** 0.00480*** 
  -0.000162 -0.000721 -0.000863 -0.000991 -0.000126 -0.000795 -0.000863 -0.000964 
ln(vehikm)  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
           
ln_r NA NA 0.273*** NA NA NA 0.0476 NA 
    -0.0619     -0.0654  
ln_s NA NA 1.418*** NA NA NA 1.935*** NA 
    -0.0888     -0.107  
lnalpha NA 0.188*** NA NA NA 0.436*** NA NA 
   -0.0269     -0.025   
           
Observations 3918 3918 3918 3616 3916 3916 3916 3614 
Number of 
groups 
NA NA 826 738 NA NA 826 738 
Log Likelihood -35897.563 -13739.078 -13320.552 -8917.891 -53606.947 -15527.577 -15186.797 -10292.309 
Note: Time dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Interestingly, the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of 
victims (vic) on highways that have high-quality of design (private_h and public_h) is lower under 
private management. This is what the statistically significant and negative coefficient tells us about 
the comparison between the private high-quality road and the public high-quality road. This result 
is consistent in all models regressed, providing first evidence of the road safety benefits of PPPs. 
When considering the coefficients associated with the highways of low-quality design (private_l and 
public_l), we observe that the expected number of victims (vic) is larger with respect to the low-
quality public road, as expected. However, note that the coefficient of the privately managed low-
quality road is substantially smaller than the coefficient associated with the low-quality publicly 
operated road, for the number of victims. Thus, we confirm that given the same quality of design, 
PPPs have a better safety performance when measured in terms of casualties (injuries and deaths). 
This result is not sustained when we measure the safety outcomes via the number of accidents with 
victims, given that the coefficients we obtain with the conditional fixed-effects model are roughly 
the same for the private and for the public low-quality roads.    
Once we have described the effects of the core variable, we proceed to interpret the coefficients of 
the rest of the control variables. Relating to infrastructure characteristics, the number of accidents 
and victims decreases when the road highway is placed on the interurban environment (interurban). 
However, the more lanes the road highway has (lanes), the more accidents and victims are found. 
This effect is in line with Abdel-Aty and Radwan (2000) and Noland and Oh (2004). A large 
percentage of heavy vehicles (heavy_vehi) is related to more accidents and victims. This result may 
be explained by the fact that even though the average speed drops with more presence of heavy 
vehicles, trucks slow down the flow and safe distances are less respected. In the case of sudden 
braking the collision probability increases and as trucks are heavier than domestic vehicles the 
probability of victims also increases. This effect is in line with Jovanis and Chang (1986). The 
coefficient of the variable GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant in almost all the 
models reported. The number of accidents and victims increases in provinces with more GDP per 
capita suggesting that people who live in provinces that are richer are more risk prone because 
greater income is generally associated with more trips and movements. Accidents and victims 
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decrease with the annual liters of alcohol consumption per capita inside the home (alcohol_pc). 
This result is counterintuitive because it is expected that regions with greater alcohol consumption 
have more accidents. However, the coefficient of alcohol_pc is negative and statistically significant in 
all models regressed. This result may be related to the fact that the variable of alcohol consumption 
is specifically in the home. People who drink more inside the home may be more concerned about 
the dangers of alcohol impaired driving and may not take the same risks of drunk-driving. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to introduce a variable capturing the alcohol consumption outside 
the home. The variable age_vehi shows an unstable behavior: in some models it is statistically 
significant and positive, while in other model regressions it is statistically significant and negative. 
These results make it difficult to obtain clear conclusions, however there is significant evidence that 
the average age of vehicle fleets has some effect on road safety outcomes. The demographic 
variables pop_20a29 and pop_˃80 have been employed as a proxy for people’s driving behavior. The 
number of accidents and victims decreases in provinces with a young driving population but 
increases with an older cohort of population. The coefficient associated with the variable rainy is 
positive and statistically significant. The number of accidents and victims increases in control 
stations where more rainy days are registered. This effect is in line with Hermans et al. (2006) and 
Caliendo et al. (2007).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 In this paper we provide the first evidence of the role of road management models on road safety 
outcomes for a national highway network. After confirming that highways with high quality road 
design are safer than those with low quality road design, disregarding the management model and 
realizing that a true comparison between management models must consider homogeneous design 
quality, we found heterogeneous effects depending on whether the management of the road was 
private or public. Our results show that privately operated roads perform better in terms of road 
safety outcomes than publicly operated roads for the high-quality standard (road design) highways. 
The annual number of accidents with victims and the annual number of victims on highways is 
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lower under Public-Private Partnerships. Results are also favorable for private operators on 
highways with low quality road design, but only in the case of the number of victims. The 
differences between road management models in low-quality roads is not statistically significant for 
the number of accidents, so we should be cautious about the implications of our results on the 
superiority of private management for this kind of road. 
These findings are important in several ways. Firstly, in order to promote road safety the 
infrastructure should support high road design characteristics. The design and initial construction 
are crucial because once the road is built it is very costly and difficult to modify the geometrical 
design. Thus, our results indicate that beyond the road management model, the most important 
factor in determining road safety outcomes is the quality standard of the road infrastructure.    
Secondly, for the same quality standard, we found that private highways show better road safety 
outcomes. It is necessary to understand the reasons behind this fact. That may feed an interesting 
line of future research. On the one hand, it may imply that private operators take actions or 
decisions that favor road safety, which may provide arguments for going private. On the other 
hand, public operators might learn from the better actions and performance of private operators in 
order to improve their outcomes, without going private. In any case, further research should focus 
on the management differences of private and public operators to better understand these safety 
implications.  
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